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THE FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF ISSOURI
TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SIXTIETH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MIsSOURI:
The Judicial Council was created under the rules of the Supreme Court
to study the judicial system and procedure of the State, with a view to the
recommendation of improvements therein. These rules require the Council
to report to the General Assembly,-to the end, no doubt, that statutory
and constitutional changes deemed expedient by the Council may be brought
to the consideration of those responsible for the provisions of our statutes
as well as for the submission of proposed constitutional changes to the voters
of the State.
Since its creation several years ago, the Council has been engaged in a
study of our judicial system with respect to its efficiency for the prompt
disposition of litigation.
It has been found that in the main the Circuit Courts of the State have
been able to respond fairly well to the increased demands of increasing liti-
gation; but not so our Appellate Courts. This, we hasten to say, is not due
to any more persistent devotion to duty on the part of the Circuit Judges
than has been manifested by those of the Appellate Courts. It is due we
think to the elasticity of the one system as compared with the rigidity of
the other. As the needs of the State require from time to time, the General
Assembly have been constitutionally able to and have, by rearranging the
circuits and increasing the number of Circuit Judges, enabled those Courts
to keep pace with the demands of increasing litigation. But this is not true
of our appellate system. There can be no corresponding changes or increases
in personnel in that system except through the medium of constitutional
amendment.
After much study and revision in the light of conferences with various
members of the bar throughout the State, who have interested themselves
herein, the Council have the honor to submit to the General Assembly a
proposed amendment to the Constitution, dealing with our Appellate Courts,
in order that the members of the General Assembly may consider whether
this proposal should be submitted to the voters of the State. This proposed
amendment is printed as an appendix hereto. It seems unnecesarry to say
that it is, of course, subject to such alterations and emendations as the
General Assembly may deem expedient before its submission to the voters.
It appears proper that as briefly as possible the Council should point to
the changes proposed in our appellate system and the reasons which have
led them to advocate such changes.
1. Unification of Appellate Courts.
Instead of three Courts of Appeal, two Divisions of the Supreme Court,
and a Supreme Court en banc, each acting independently and, particularly
as to the Courts of Appeal at least, without immediate knowledge as te
what the others are doing and saying, the plan proposes one Supreme Court
consisting of (a) the Judges of the Court as a whole for the performance
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of administrative duties; (b) a central division called, as at present, the
Court en banc, consisting of not less than seven Judges, in which the
supreme judicial authority of the State is lodged; and (c) divisions of the
Supreme Court, taking the place of the present Courts of Appeal and the
present divisions of the Supreme Court itself, and sitting where the Court
may direct from time to time for the hearing of causes ordered assigned
thereto by the Court at large. Any Judge of the Court may sit anywhere
as directed by the Court at large. This it is believed will serve to equalize
the work and prevent one Judge from being overworked while another has
not enough to do to fully occupy his time, as is the case at present in some
instances. The ideal situation for the prompt disposition of litigation is the
utilization of the services of a Judge where his services are most needed for
the time being.
A committee of the American Bar Association, after extended study, re-
ported to that Association recently, with the approval of the Association,
that a Supreme Court composed of such divisions as are necessary, will
ordinarily dispose of litigation with more celerity and certainty than will
a judicial system composed of a Supreme Court and a number of independent
inferior Appellate Courts with final jurisdiction. Some States which, like
ourselves, have tried the latter have abandoned it. And in those States
which, like our own, maintain a system of independent inferior Appellate
Courts, inquiry of members of the bar develops a strong dissatisfaction
therewith.
Under our present system the Courts of Appeal, acting independently
as they do, arrive with more or less frequency at conflicting conclusions.
If they were but arms of a single judicial body, filing their opinions at the
same place, and if these were examined regularly by a Chief Justice of the
Court as they come in, such inconsistencies ought to be ascertained and
remedied before it is too late.
2. Uncertainty of Jurisdiction.
There arise with us, with some frequency, cases where it is uncertain
whether the jurisdiction of the appeal is in the Supreme Court or one of
the Courts of Appeal. In those instances there is often unavoidable but
regrettable delay in disposing of the appeal. If such a case is lodged with
the wrong Court it perforce lies on the docket of that Court until reached
in its order and is then transferred where it is believed to belong. Here
again it must await its turn on the docket. If the transfer chances to be
by a Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, the latter Court, having the
final responsibility on the question, may, on reaching the case in its turn,
decide that the transfer was erroneous and send the case back to the Court
of Appeals where again it must await its turn on the docket.
If there were but the one Court with jurisdiction of all appeals, all this
uncertainty and consequent delay would be eliminated. The time and talents
of our Appellate Judges ought to be directed to the consideration of the
ultimate merits of litigation before them to the exclusion, as far as possible,
of questions having no relation to the merits of the cause.
As an illustration of the delay which can occur in the disposition of
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litigation under our present system, reference is made to Breit vs. Bowland.
This litigation originated in Andrew County and judgment was rendered
in the Circuit Court of that County November 20, 1933. An appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court and the case was there reached on the docket
and heard January 14, 1936. On examination of the record the Supreme
Court determined that the appeal should have gone to the Kansas City
Court of Appeals, and, accordingly, on March 21, 1936 the Supreme Court
transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. It was docketed and heard
in the Kansas City Court of Appeals on the 6th day of October, 1936, and
decided by that Court December 7, 1936. An application was made to the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on the only ground available, to
wit, that the opinion of the Kansas City Court of Appeals was contrary
to controlling decisions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed
the writ, and the cause was docketed and heard in that Court on this ques-
tion May 20, 1937. The Supreme Court in due course decided that the
opinion of the Kansas City Court of Appeals was contrary to its own prior
decisions and set the Appellate Court opinion aside. The Supreme Court
did not, and could not, under the present system, deal with or express any
opinion as to the ultimate right and merit of the lawsuit. This left the case
pending in the Kansas City Court of Appeals for decision, where it now
lies awaiting its turn on the docket. Information from the Clerk of that
Court is that it will be on the docket of the March Term, 1939, and there-
fore it should be disposed of sometime before the summer adjournment of
1939. This delay, it must be understood, is no fault of the Judges of the
two Courts, but of the system to which they owe allegiance, and which they
must enforce. Under the system proposed by the Council this case would
probably have been determined in the first instance by a Division of the
Supreme Court; and if the Court en bane, on examining the opinion on
applications of the losing litigant, proved to be of opinion that the decision
of the Division was wrong, it would itself have reviewed the case and pro-
nounced final judgment as to the right of the parties, and the litigation
would have been thereby terminated at a much earlier date than will now
prove to be the case.
3. Review by Court en bane.
Under our present system the decisions of the Courts of Appeal are
final with only two exceptions, to be presently noted. It not infrequently
happens that a Court of Appeals finally disposes of a particular lawsuit
on a particular theory of the law, which at an uncertain period thereafter
the Supreme Court in some other litigation pronounces to have been errone-
ous. The result is that some citizen has lost his lawsuit on principles of
law which the highest judicial authority of his State has said to be errone-
ous, but has said it too late to do him any good.
If a Judge of a Court of Appeals believes the decision of that Court to
be contrary to a decision of the Supreme Court, he can ask that the cause
be transferred to the Supreme Court for determination. But of late years
this is a power which is seldom exercised. And if the Supreme Court itself
believes that a decision of an Appellate Court is contrary to some decision
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of its own, it can issue a writ of certiorari and determine that question.
But on such a writ it cannot consider the ultimate right or wrong of the
decision, or what ought to be done with the case.
The Council are convinced that this limitation on the review of Appellate
Court decisions by the Supreme Court is entirely too narrow. There are
constantly arising in the State, in cases within the final jurisdiction of the
Courts of Appeal, questions of the gravest importance, on which the Su-
preme Court has never spoken, but which, in the interests of the citizens of
the State, ought to be determined and set at rest at the earliest possible
moment by the highest judicial authority of the State.
The plan submited by the Council therefore broadens the power of the
Court en banc to review divisional opinions under such regulations as the
Court at large may prescribe. The plan proposed is to be roughly likened
at this point to review by the Supreme Court of the United States of deci-
sions of the Federal Courts of Appeal.
4. Man Power.
There are now sixteen Appellate Judges in the State. By the proposed
amendment these and their successors are made Judges of the Supreme
Court to sit en banc or division as assigned by the Court, by the action of
at least a majority of all the Judges.
We also have now ten Commissioners appointed under Acts of the Gen-
eral Assembly. The plan of the Council was not intended to and does not
interfere with the continued power of the General Assembly to provide for
Commissioners as may be thought best from time to time.
But the power to hear and decide appeals cannot constitutionally be con-
ferred on the Commissioners. They can only write reasons for decisions
arrived at by the Judges, for approval or rejection by the Judges them-
selves. In the opinion of the Council there is need for elasticity in the
personnel of the Court with respect to power to hear and determine litiga-
tion. This we undertook to provide by authorizing the Court at large to
call selected Circuit Judges to sit as Divisional Judges when and as often
as necessary, dependent on the amount of work needed to be done at the
time. It is the view of the Council that this provision will provide sufficient
elasticity to enable the Court to keep up with the work, particularly in view
of the power of the General Assembly to increase the number of Circuit
Judges, from time to time, as experience shall show to be necessary in view
of this added duty which some of them will be called on to perform. It
seems unnecessary for the Council to point out to members of the General
Assembly that we have many Circuit Judges in the State entirely capable
of serving as Judges of the proposed Divisions of the Supreme Court with
honor to themselves and credit to the State.
5. Terms of Court.
The Constitution now provides for two terms of the Supreme Court an-
nually. Appeals are returnable to a given term and no matter what the
exigency or the permissive state of its docket, the Court cannot deal with
an appeal until that term arrives. Except for that useless technicality,
terms of the Court have in actual practice ceased to mean anything, as
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the Court is practically always kept open. Accordingly the Council have
drawn this proposal so as to abolish the unnecessary and hampering terms
and to provide that the Court shall be deemed always open. Power is con-
ferred upon the Court to provide by rule when an appeal shall be returnable.
6. Selection of Judges.
For many years the Constitution of the State has provided for the
election of Judges by popular election. Recognizing this as the existing
method, the proposed amendment makes no change therein except to pro-
vide that three shall be resident in and elected by the voters of each of
the present Appellate Court Districts. The purpose of this provision is to
insure local representation on the bench, which the Council have regarded
as desirable.
The Council have been informed that representatives of the State Bar
Association intend to submit to this session of the General Assembly a
proposed constitutional amendment providing for a different method of
selection of Judges. The Council have endeavored to so word the amend-
ment submitted herewith as not to interfere with what the General Assem-
bly may see fit to submit to the voters of the State in that respect.
7. Compensation of Judges.
The Council have taken the view that the salary of a Judge of the
Supreme Court ought to be sufficient to compensate him for yielding his
practice at the bar, probably for all time, and for the arduous mental
labors of dealing with the varied litigation of a populous and wealthy State.
The Council also believe it ought to be sufficiently large to attract the very
best talent available. In such a position of responsibility as a Judge of
the Supreme Court, the people of the State are entitled to the best. No
man ought to have to make the financial sacrifice which many of our Judges
now make as the price of serving the public on the Supreme Bench. Ac-
cordingly the proposal submitted carries an increase in the compensation of
the Judges of the Court.
While, under the present Constitution the compensation of the Judges
may be increased by the General Assembly, it can only be done for the
future and cannot be made applicable to existing incumbents. Since all
of the Judges of the Court do not go out of office at the same time, the
result of this provision, in case of such an increase, is to require one Judge
to serve for less money than the man who sits beside him on the bench
and equally shares his labors and responsibilities. This is manifestly unfair.
Consequently the proposed amendment confers power on the General Assem-
bly to increase the compensation of the Judges to keep pace with the progress
and increase in wealth of the State, by enactments applying uniformly to
all the Judges at the same time.
Conclusion.
The Council are asking the General Assembly to consider the submission
of this proposal to the voters of the State. It has been found impossible
to set down on paper, with any detail, all the reasons which have led the
Council to this recommendation without going beyond readable limits. The
members of the Council will be glad, on notice, to attend upon the proper
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committee of either or both houses, or a joint session of these committees
and make further explanation as desired, as well as assist, as far as lies
in their power, in making the proposal conform to the views of the General
Assembly.
Respectfully submitted,
E. L. AiLoRD,
JOHN R. BAKER,
JULIUS H. DRUCKER,
JAMES A. FINCH,
BROWN HARRIs,
FRANK C. MANN,
LESLIE A. WELCH,
Roy D. WILLIAMS,
FRANK H. SULLIVAN,
Chairman.
Proposed Amendment to the Constitution oj Missouri
Relating to the Judiciary
Be It Resolved by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri,
That at the general election to be held in this State on the first Tuesday
after the first Monday in November in the year 1940, or at a special elec-
tion to be called by the Governor in his discretion prior to such general
election, there shall be submitted to the qualified voters of the State, for
adoption or rejection, the following amendment to the Constitution of Mis-
souri concerning the judicial department:
SECTION 1. Effective January 1, 1942, the St. Louis, Kansas City and
Springfield Courts of Appeal are abolished and all causes then pending
before those Courts shall be transferred to the Supreme Court, in which
shall vest all appellate and original jurisdiction now vested by law in the
Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal.
The records and files of the Courts of Appeal shall be transferred to and
become records and fies of the Supreme Court.
SECTION 2. The seat of the Supreme Court shall be and remain at the
seat of Government. The State shall provide offices for the Clerk of the
Supreme Court at the seat of Government and elsewhere as the Court may
order, and offices and court rooms for the Judges thereof at such place or
places as the Court shall from time to time direct.
SECTION 3. The Supreme Court shall be composed of sixteen Judges.
As to the effective date of this amendment the then Judges of the Supreme
Court and of the Courts of Appeal shall become Judges of the Supreme
Court for their respective terms. The General Assembly shall provide for
the payment of the expenses of the Court and of the Judges and officers
thereof while in the performance of their respective official duties. The
compensation of the Judges shall be $10,000.00 per annum, which the Gen-
eral Assembly may increase by provisions applying uniformly and without
reference to the terms of the respective Judges.
SECTION 4. The successors to the Judges of the Supreme Court as hereby
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constituted shall be chosen as provided by law. And if and so long as chosen
by popular election three thereof shall be resident in the territory now
comprising the District of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, which shall be
known as the First Supreme Court District; three in that now comprising
the District of the Kansas City Court of Appeals, which shall be known
as the Second Supreme Court District; and three in that now comprising
the District of the Springfield Court of Appeals, which shall be known as
the Third Supreme Court District; and these shall be chosen by the quali-
fied voters of such districts respectively, and the remainder of the Judges
of the Court, without reference to their places of residence within the State,
shall be elected by the voters of the State at large; and for the purpose
of determining whether vacancies shall be filled at large or from the dis-
tricts aforesaid, the present Judges of the Courts of Appeal shall be deemed
to have been elected Judges of the Supreme Court for their respective terms
and from their respective districts, and the other Judges of the Court shall
be deemed to have been elected at large.
SECTION 5. A majority of the Judges of the Court shall constitute a
quorum for the performance of administrative duties now or hereafter pro-
vided by law.
The Court shall from time to time elect one of the Judges to be Chief
Justice for such term as the Court shall from time to time, by general rule
or order direct.
The Supreme Court en bane shall consist of the Chief Justice and such
additional Judges of the Court, not less than six in number, as the Court
may by general rule or order direct. The Court shall assign Judges thereof
to sit in the Court en bane for such periods as the Court may by rule or
order direct. Sessions of the Court en banc shall be at the seat of Govern-
ment.
SECTION 6. The Court shall by general rule or order provide for such
Divisions of the Court, composed of not less than three Judges thereof
assigned thereto by the Court to sit at such times and places and in such
numbers as the Court may by general rule or order direct, for the hearing
of such causes as the Court shall direct to be assigned thereto, having re-
gard to the convenience of the parties. The Court may by general rule or
order provide for the hearing of causes in the first instance by the Court
en banc; and on its own motion, or on application under such rules and
regulations as the Court may prescribe, the Court en bane may order a
rehearing before itself of any cause heard and determined by a Division.
All opinions of the Divisions and of the Court en bane shall be filed and
promulgated at the seat of Government.
SECTION 7. Terms of the Supreme Court and of the Divisions thereof
are abolished, and the Court shall be deemed always open. The Court shall
by rule prescribe when appeals shall be returnable and when judgments of
the Court en bane and of the Divisions shall become final.
SECTION 8. On order of the Court the Chief Justice shall designate a
Circuit Judge or Judges from lists prepared and approved by the Court
to act as a special Judge or special Judges of any Division of the Court
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for the hearing and determination of causes in such Division. Judges so
selected shall be paid their necessary expenses and such additional com-
pensation as will make their total compensation during the period of such
service equal to that of Judges of the Supreme Court.
SEcTrIoN 9. Any Circuit Judge called to service on a Division of the
Supreme Court as herein provided may call any other Circuit Judge to act
in his stead as Circuit Judge during the period of such service, and the
Judge so called shall be paid his expenses during the period of such service.
SWTioN 10. All provisions of the Constitution of the State, and all laws
thereof not consistent with this amendment, shall, upon its adoption and
as of its effective date, be forever rescinded and of no effect.
Nom. This Report of the Judicial Council of Missouri, as well as others
to follow, is carried as a service to our readers. The WASHINGTON UNrvER-
siTY LAw QUARTERLY professes no connection with the Judicial Council and
assumes no attitude toward the reports other than that of making them
promptly and accurately available to members of the bar.
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